Shell from the outside: choosing a strategy for the energy transition

This is the second half of a two-part analysis of Shell plc. The first part looked inward at finances, people and operations. This one looks outward: the industry, the market, and what Shell should do next.
The brief was to analyse the environment, propose strategies, and then choose between them on evidence rather than preference.
The environment
A PESTLE analysis of the oil and gas industry produced more threats than opportunities.
- Political: supply routes are exposed to conflict. The Strait of Hormuz alone carries around a fifth of global oil supply.
- Economic: oil price swings feed directly into inflation, hitting importing countries hardest.
- Social: the energy transition is reducing long-term demand for oil and gas, even while short-term production stays high.
- Technological: the one clear opportunity. Advanced drilling, enhanced recovery and AI are raising efficiency and opening reserves that were out of reach.
- Legal: climate litigation is growing, covering damages, greenwashing and failure to cut emissions.
- Environmental: spills bring penalties, tighter regulation and higher safety costs.
How attractive is the industry?
Porter's Five Forces gave a mixed answer.
- Threat of new entrants: weak. The capital required is enormous, regulation is heavy, most reserves are controlled by national oil companies, and only around a quarter of exploration projects succeed commercially.
- Threat of substitutes: high. Electric car sales passed 17 million in 2024, and renewables supplied about a third of global electricity.
- Buyer power: moderate. A handful of large consuming countries have real negotiating weight, and new LNG export capacity is shifting leverage towards buyers.
- Supplier power: high. Oilfield services and specialist equipment come from a small number of firms, and switching is costly and disruptive.
- Rivalry: high. Large, well-funded competitors, with heavy fixed assets that make exit difficult.
Incumbents like Shell are protected from newcomers but squeezed from every other direction.
Where the market is going
Two forecasts shaped my thinking.
Oil demand is expected to keep rising to around 105 million barrels a day by 2030, driven by emerging economies in Asia, and then flatten as electric vehicles and renewables take hold.
LNG looks different. Demand is forecast to rise by around 60% by 2040, again led by Asia, as countries use gas as a transition fuel. That is where Shell is already strongest.
Shell's position
Shell is expanding LNG, investing in low-carbon energy, and returning large amounts of cash to shareholders. But it faces a set of problems that pull against each other: pressure to move away from fossil fuels, ongoing climate litigation, investors who doubt its LNG demand outlook, and a reserve replacement ratio that raises questions about future production.
Its current strategy tries to do everything at once. I wanted to propose something more specific.
Two options
1. Energy Platform Pivot (group level). Shell would move from selling energy products to selling energy as a service. Instead of separate businesses for renewable power, EV charging, hydrogen and carbon capture, it would bundle them into a single decarbonisation package for industrial and corporate customers, delivered under long-term contracts and managed through a digital platform that lets clients track usage and emissions.
The appeal is recurring, contracted revenue that is less exposed to the oil price.
2. Digital Gas Arbitrage (Integrated Gas). Shell would use AI-driven forecasting to exploit price differences between the main gas hubs in the US, Europe and Asia: buying LNG where it is oversupplied and redirecting cargoes, even mid-voyage, to wherever the price is highest. It builds directly on Shell's existing fleet and trading expertise.
Testing them
I assessed both for feasibility (can Shell fund and resource it?) and acceptability (is the risk worth the return, and will stakeholders support it?).
The arbitrage strategy scored well on feasibility. Shell already has the ships, the data and the traders. But the returns are attractive mainly in the short term, the risk is high, it deepens dependence on a volatile market, and it does nothing to answer the criticism Shell faces on climate.
The platform strategy needs heavy upfront investment and has a long payback period. But it is supported by Shell's cash flow, uses capabilities the company already has, and aligns with what shareholders, governments and industrial customers are asking for.
I recommended the Energy Platform Pivot and rejected the arbitrage strategy, with the investment phased by market and each business unit given clear governance and KPIs, since coordination across units is the most likely point of failure.
What I took from it
On a narrow financial view, the arbitrage strategy looked better. Rejecting it was a useful discipline. A strategy is not good because it is clever or profitable in isolation; it has to hold up against the company's risks, its stakeholders and the direction of its market. Setting the criteria first and scoring afterwards is what made the choice defensible.
Based on a report I wrote during my BA (Hons) Accounting and Finance at the University of Greenwich. Market figures and forecasts are from the sources cited in the original report and reflect the position at the time of writing.